光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第6578期
主题：Regulatory punishment in an oligopolistic market: Evidence from credit rating agencies寡头市场中的监管处罚:来自信用评级机构的证据
主讲人：麦考瑞大学 周青副教授
主持人：中国西部经济研究院 周凡副教授
时间：9月22日 10:30-12:00
举办地点：柳林校区颐德楼H412
主办单位：中国西部经济研究院 科研处
主讲人简介：
Clara Qing Zhou，麦考瑞大学商学院应用金融系，副教授，博士生导师。主要研究方向为corporate finance, climate finance和digital finance。多篇文章发表在Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Empirical Finance等。工作论文获得AFAANZ Best Paper 2023，国际ESG论坛2023 Best Paper Award，和亚洲金融年会2021 Best Paper Award等。
内容简介：
Regulatory punishment in the oligopolistic credit rating market is a delicate government intervention due to its potential high social cost. We exploit a unique feature of the Chinese bond market with a government-backed rating agency and explore a regulatory punishment on Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. Ltd. The intention behind this punishment is to improve the internal control and rating quality of credit rating agencies (CRAs). We show that the punishment has a short-term deterring effect on Dagong but worsens the quality of its ratings post-punishment. Less competitive rating agencies lower their ratings' quality, while highly reputable ones become more conservative. We highlight the potential unintended consequences on markets' competitive dynamics that regulators should consider when regulating oligopolistic markets.
在寡头式信用评级市场中的监管惩罚是一种因其潜在的高社会成本而需谨慎的政府干预。我们利用中国债券市场的一个独特特点，即有政府支持的评级机构，并探讨了对大公国际信用评级有限公司（Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. Ltd.）的监管惩罚。这一惩罚的目的是改善信用评级机构（CRAs）的内部控制和评级质量。我们表明，这种惩罚对大公国际信用评级在短期内有威慑效应，但在惩罚后会使其评级质量恶化。较不竞争的评级机构降低了其评级质量，而声誉较高的评级机构变得更加保守。我们强调了监管机构在监管寡头式市场时应考虑的市场竞争动态的潜在意外后果。
