光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第6539期
主题：Stuck in the Wisdom of Crowds: Information, Knowledge, and Heuristics群众智慧如何影响个体决策：知识、信息、与经验法则
主讲人：山东大学经济研究院 郑捷教授
主持人：工商管理学院 赵琳教授
时间：6月26日 15:00-17:00
直播平台及会议ID：腾讯会议，会议ID：156-347-078
主办单位：工商管理学院 科研处
主讲人简介：
郑捷，清华大学经济学学士、硕士，美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士、博士，山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师，山大特聘教授，清华大学经济科学与政策实验室常务副主任。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学，研究主题涵盖机制设计、市场设计、信息设计等经典问题和合作协调、信任互惠、参照依赖等行为问题。主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题获“特优“评价），并多次在学术会议上做主旨演讲与专题报告。研究工作发表于《经济研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等国内外经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名期刊。
内容提要：
Collective knowledge is significantly affected by information about others’ viewpoints. However, under what conditions does the “wisdom of crowds” help versus harm knowledge of factual information? In this experiment, we present subjects with the task of answering 50 factual true or false trivia questions, with the potential opportunity to revise their answers after receiving different levels of information about other subjects’ answers and self-assessed confidence levels from an independent session. We find that information about others’ answers improves performance on easy questions, but tends to harm performance on difficult questions. In addition, information about answers provided by other subjects mainly improves performance for those with lower initial knowledge levels. Subjects in our Moderate-Information condition outperform those in either the Low- or Full-Information condition, implying an optimal level of social information provision, in which the Majority Rule and Maximum Confidence rule complement one another. Although the Maximum Confidence rule can improve performance, yielding the lowest overall error rate out of the heuristics considered, subjects generally underutilize the information on other subjects’ confidence levels in favor of the Majority Rule heuristic. These findings shed light on possible directions for policies that can cultivate factual knowledge on online opinion platforms.
集体知识受到关于他人观点的信息的显著影响。在什么条件下，“群众的智慧”有助于对抗对事实信息的伤害？在本实验中，我们让受试者回答50个基于客观事实的判断题，在允许被试在得到他人决策信息之后修改自己答案。我们发现，关于他人决策的信息可以提高被试在简单问题上的表现，但往往会损害困难问题的表现。此外，他人决策的信息主要提高了那些初始知识水平较低的被试的成绩。
